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We compare adverse event rates for surgical inpatients across 36 public hospitals in the state 
of Victoria, Australia, conditioning on differences in patient complexity across hospitals.  We 
estimate separate models for elective and emergency patients which stay at least one night in 
hospitals, using fixed effects complementary log-log models to estimate AEs as a function of 
patient and episode characteristics, and hospital effects.  We use 4 years of patient level 
administrative hospital data (2002/03 to 2005/06), and estimate separate models for each 
year.  Averaged over four years, we find that adverse event rates are 12% for elective surgical 
inpatients,  and  12.5%  for  emergency  surgical  inpatients.    Most  teaching  hospitals  have 
surprisingly low adverse event rates, at least after adjusting for the higher medical complexity 
of their patients.  Some larger regional hospitals have high adverse events rates, in particular 
after adjusting for the below average complexity of their patients.  Also, some suburban 
hospitals have high rates, especially the ones located in areas of low socioeconomic profile.  
We speculate that high rates may be due to factors beyond the control of the hospitals, such 
as staff shortages.  We conclude that at present, care should be taken when using adverse 
event rates as indicators of hospital quality.  
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It is estimated that adverse events (AE) during hospital admission affect nearly one out of 10 
patients (de Vries, Ramrattan et al. 2008).  An AE is usually defined as an unintended injury 
or complication resulting in prolonged hospital stay, disability at the time of discharge or 
death and caused by healthcare management rather than by the patient‟s underlying disease 
process (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995; Thomas, Studdert et al. 2000).  AE are now widely 
agreed to be a serious problem, annually killing more people than motor vehicle accidents, 
breast cancer, and AIDS.  This makes AE the fifth leading cause of death in the USA (Kohn, 
Corrigan et al. 2000).  Thus, prevention of AE promises significant societal benefits.   
 
In recent  years, the focus in thinking about AEs has shifted from the person approach—
blaming individuals for errors—to the systems approach (de Vries, Ramrattan et al. 2008).  
The systems  approach assumes  that people will make mistakes,  and that the system  that 
surrounds them should provide a safety net for these mistakes.  Therefore, efforts to eliminate 
AEs  should  be  directed  towards  a  particular  system,  i.e.  hospital  or  hospital  department 
(Dankelman and Grimbergen 2005).  In practice, these efforts aim to reduce the complexity 
of  providing  medical  care,  by  -for  example-  standardization  of  procedures  and  medical 
equipment, checklists, quality testing of medical equipment, and staff training.   Both the 
implementation  and  ongoing  upkeep  of  such  measures  are  associated  with  costs  to  the 
hospital, because they require investments in equipment and additional staff time.  Thus, 
efforts aimed at improving hospital quality should only be implemented when significant 
benefits can be expected, and they should be targeted towards hospitals with the greatest 
potential  for  reductions  in  AE.    To  this  end,  it  is  necessary  to  gain  a  more  detailed 
understanding of AE, in particular which hospitals experience highest rates of AE.  This will 
help hospital managers and politicians to work towards elimination of AE on hospital level 
and target efforts to hospitals with greatest need for improvement.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate adverse event rates for surgical inpatients in 36 public 
hospitals in the state of Victoria, Australia, conditional on observable differences in patient 
complexity  across  hospitals.    We  estimate  separate  models  for  elective  and  emergency 
patients which stay at least one night in hospitals, using fixed effects complementary log-log 
models to model AEs as a function of patient and episode characteristics, and hospital effects 4 
 
(dummies).    We  use  4  years  of  patient  level  administrative  hospital  data  (2002/03  to 
2005/06), and estimate separate models for each year.   
 
Methods  
For the purpose of analysis we assume that adverse events may arise for four main reasons: 
patient explanatory factors (such as comorbidities and age), hospital level explanatory factors 
(such  as  teaching  status,  staffing  levels  or  size),  unobservable  factors  on  hospital  level 
(hospital effects), and unobservable factors on patient level (interpreted as random chance).  
The  economic  literature  on  hospital  performance  interprets  hospital  effects  often  as 
„managerial effort‟ or policies and regulations affecting a particular hospital (Jacobs, Smith et 
al. 2006).  This interpretation of hospital effects relies on the assumption that other sources of 
variation, most notably systematic variation in patients‟ medical complexity across hospitals, 
are sufficiently taken account of in the analysis.  If hospital effects represent managerial 
effort, this implies that variations in AE rates across hospitals which remain after taking 
account of differences in observable factors and random chance give an indication of the 
extent to which AEs may be amenable to interventions by the hospitals (Hauck, Rice et al. 
2003; Jacobs, Smith et al. 2006; Smith and Street 2006).   
It also implies that a certain portion of AEs which are attributable to unobservable factors on 
hospital level  can  be considered preventable.   Our analysis cannot  inform  how high this 
proportion is.  However, if a hospital has significantly higher/lower AE rates than average in 
all four years (conditional on observable factors), we interpret this as evidence that factors on 
hospital level contribute to these high/low rates of AEs.  Some of these factors, such as poor 
safety procedures, may be amenable to the actions of hospital management.  Thus, hospitals 
with above average AE rates in all four years may have shortcomings in their management, 
and may attract further enquiry and detailed investigation, and possibly implementation of 
procedures to prevent AEs in future.  Hospitals with below average AE rates, on the other 
hand, seem to do well and policy makers may want to identify the reasons for low AE rates, 
and possibly learn more about their successful management strategies.   
Modelling adverse events is fraught with various methodological problems, some of which 
we address in this paper.  First, AEs are infrequent events.  The (unadjusted) rate of AEs 
varies between 16.8% and 17.8% for elective, and 15.7% and 18.6% for emergency inpatient 
episodes over the observation period (Tables 2 and 3).  We use asymmetric complementary 5 
 
log-log models, which are usually recommended for binary dependent variable models with 
unequal distribution of zeroes and ones, in our situation excess zeroes (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005).  A second problem arises due to clustering effects with respect to hospitals, i.e. patients 
in the same hospitals are more alike than patients in different hospitals.  One patient having 
an AE is likely to increase the probability of another patient in the same hospital (or hospital 
department) having an AE.  This is because system failures and insufficient safety measures 
affect  many  or  all  procedures  undertaken  in  the  hospital,  infections  may  spread  across 
patients, or faulty medical devices may be used for several procedures.  In rare instances, the 
incompetence of one doctor may lead to AEs in several of his patients.  We take account of 
clustering with hospital specific fixed effects.  
Suppose the propensity of suffering an adverse event for the i-th episode is given by the latent 
equation: 
 
    
*
0 i i X i H i AE X H         ,            (1) 
 
with 
* 0 i AE   mapped to  1 i AE   if patient i suffered at least one adverse event and 
* 0 i AE   
to  0 i AE    if  not,  where  i X   is  a  vector  of  covariates  representing  patient  observable 
characteristics,  and  i H   is  a  vector  of  hospital  dummies,  all  's    are  coefficients  to  be 
estimated, and  i   is the error term which is assumed to follow the extreme value (or log-
Weibull) distribution.  The coefficient vector  H   measures the marginal effects of individual 
hospitals on the propensity of AEs that are not attributable to observable patient risk factors.  
They can be used to quantify the hospital fixed effects and compare hospitals with respect to 
the probability of AEs.  We estimate separate models for elective and emergency inpatients, 
and for each of the 4 years.  
 
Data 
We  use  the  Victorian  Admitted  Episodes  Data  (VAED)  for  surgical  inpatients  in  public 
hospitals in the state of Victoria, Australia, for four years from 2002/03 to 2005/06.  The 
VAED are administrative hospital data of high quality as hospitals have a strong financial 6 
 
incentive to generate detailed records of all their patients because they receive the largest part 
of their budget via casemix funding.  Our sample consists of 36 hospitals with over 72,000 
inpatient elective episodes, and over 41,000 inpatient emergency episodes in each year (see 
tables 2 and 3).  One hospital does not report AEs in any of the years.  Each episode starts 
with a patient‟s admission to a hospital department and ends with her discharge from that 
department.  We exclude dialysis, radiology, chemotherapy, and dental  episodes, and we 
exclude patients under 18 years of age.   Hospital dummies are included for all hospitals 
which report more than 2000 surgical episodes in at least three of the four years.  All other 
hospitals make up the reference (base) category.  We cannot estimate fixed effects for those 
reference hospitals, but they would be problematic to interpret anyway because  reference 
hospitals are small regional hospitals which only perform simple procedures associated with 
few AEs.  We limit our sample to surgical inpatients, i.e. patients staying at least one night, in 
surgical „Disease Resource Groups‟.  Modelling AEs for medical patients is complicated by 
the fact that their length of stay in hospital may impact on the probability of suffering AEs 
(Hauck and Zhao 2010).   
Table  1  provides  definitions  of  all  variables,  and  tables  2  and  3  summary  statistics  for 
elective  and  emergency  inpatients,  respectively.  The  dependent  variable  „AE‟  indicates 
whether the patient experienced one or several AEs during admission.  We code „AE‟ as a 
binary variable because different AEs during one episode may not be independent events.  
For example, a patient may suffer both hemorrhaging and an infection due to one mistake 
during surgery.  Recording two or more AEs per episode would overstate the number of 
mistakes happening in hospitals.  Victorian hospitals record AEs arising during the episode.  
These so-called „complicating conditions‟ are not present at the time of the admission (or 
when the episode of care commenced), and they are “conditions resulting from misadventure 
during surgical or medical care in the current episode of care, or an abnormal reaction to, or 
later complication of, surgical or medical care occurring during the current episode of care” 
(Department of Health 2005).  A previously existing condition that was not diagnosed until 
after the episode of care started is not an AE, but an associated condition or the primary 
diagnosis if it is the reason for admission; see Ehsani et al. (2006) for a more detailed analysis 
of the types and incidences of AEs in Victorian hospitals.   
Most  explanatory  variables  describe  characteristics  of  the  patient,  in  particular  medical 
complexity, and characteristics of the surgical episode.  Severity grades are based on reported 7 
 
diagnoses and treatments.  Patients who have multiple stays in hospital in the financial year, 
are subjected to a larger number of procedures, are transferred or die at the end of the episode 
are likely to be more complex.  It has been shown that emergency surgical patients admitted 
on a weekend or a public holiday experience higher rates of AEs (Bell and Redelmeier 2001; 
Gogel, Liron et al. 2002; Arias, Taylor et al. 2004; Cram, Hillis et al. 2004; Becker 2007; 
Fonarow, Abraham et al. 2008; Schwierz, Augurzky et al. 2009).  This may be due to delays 
in treatment because of staff shortages, or surgeries undertaken by inexperienced medical 
staff.  Patient level indicators of medical need are „age‟, „obesity‟, „seifa‟ as an indicator of 
social advantage on small area level, and „private‟ showing whether a patient payed privately 
for the stay in hospital.  In Australia, a large part of private payments are reimbursed by 
private  health  insurance,  the  uptake  of  which  is  linked  to  income.    We  include  two 
interactions terms (age*number of procedures and age*multiple stays) in all models.  We 
further  adjust  for  patients‟  medical  complexity  by  including  separately  all  comorbidities 
comprised in the Charlson index (Charlson, Pompei et al. 1987).  A patient is classified as 
suffering  one  or  more  of  these  comorbidities  based  on  recorded  diagnoses  codes.    To 
guarantee anonymity of the hospitals in our study we do not disclose their names.  However, 
for interpretation of the results, we do classify hospitals into six types according to their 
geographical location, teaching status and whether they are specialized on certain types of 
procedures.   
 
Results and Discussion 
Tables 4 and 5 show marginal effects (ME) and average effects (AvE) of the explanatory 
variables for elective and emergency inpatients, respectively, figures 1-4 and 5-8 display AE 
rates for elective and emergency inpatients for all hospitals, conditional on other explanatory 
factors, figure 9 displays conditional AE rates for elective inpatients for all years and for 
hospitals  which  significantly  diverge  from  average  rates  in  all  four  years,  and  figure  10 
displays  AE  rates  for  elective  inpatients  for  all  years,  unadjusted  for  other  explanatory 
factors.   
 
   8 
 
Average and Marginal Effects 
AvE and ME are evaluated at the means of the other explanatory variables.  Most effects are 
as expected.  Age, number of procedures, high medical severity grading 3, and experiencing 
multiple hospital stays in a year all significantly increase risk of AEs, both for elective and 
emergency patients.  Being transferred is associated with increased risk of AEs for elective 
patients, but decreased risk for emergency patients.  This divergence could be explained by 
differences in the underlying reasons for transfers between these two patient groups.  Elective 
patients may be transferred at the end of their stay, for example to rehabilitation, whereas 
complex emergency patients are transferred early on, for example to a teaching hospital.  If 
this  is  the  case,  AEs  for  elective  patients  are  more  likely  to  be  reported  in  the  original 
hospital, whereas AEs for emergency patients are reported in the destination hospital.   
Paying privately decreases risk for elective patients (although the effect is only statistically 
significant in 2004/05), but increases risk for emergency patients (statistically significant only 
in the last two years).  Paying privately reduces waiting times for both patient groups.  Private 
paying elective patients are likely to have a higher socioeconomic profile, and may therefore 
constitute a patient group of lower medical need and thus lower risk for AEs.  Private paying 
emergency  patients,  on  the  other  hand,  may  have  an  inelastic  demand  for  medical  care 
because  they  have  acute  health  problems  and  thus  a  high  willingness  to  pay  for  prompt 
medical  treatment  irrespective  of  income.    Social  advantage,  gender,  private  payment, 
obesity,  weekend  admission,  or  whether  the  patient  died  in  hospital  have  no  significant 
effects  on  AE rates.    It is  not  surprising that comparably large  effects are  estimated  for 
medical  severity  grading  3  with  an  increase  in  probability  of  around  10%  for  elective 
patients,  and  between  3.6%  and  6.4%  for  emergency  patients.    Elective  and  emergency 
patients with multiple stays in hospital in a year experience between 3.5% and 5.9% higher 
probability of AEs.   
Comorbidities which significantly increase risk of complications in particular for emergency 
patients are cerebrovascular event, acute myocardial infarction, peripheral vascular disease, 
cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and peptic ulcer.  In some years, patients with 
one or several of these comorbidities experience an up to 11% greater risk of AEs.  Chronic 
heart failure is mainly a risk factor for elective surgical patients.  Surprisingly, suffering from 
diabetes, metastatic cancer or hemiplegia/paraplegia (emergency patients only) significantly 9 
 
decreases  probability  of  AEs,  in  comparison  to  not  suffering  from  those  comorbidities.  
Possibly,  patients  with  these  comorbidities  are  subjected  to  less  complex  and  invasive 
procedures than comparable patients without them.  This in turn may decrease the risk of AEs 
for patients with these particular comorbidities.   
 
Hospital Fixed Effects 
Figures 1-4 show AEs rates by hospital for elective surgical inpatients by year, and figures 5-
8 show AE rates for emergency surgical inpatients, conditional on other explanatory factors.  
The figures indicate the type of hospital (sub: suburban; teach: teaching; reg: regional, spec: 
specialty).  The horizontal axes mark the predicted (average) rates of AEs across the whole 
sample, which increase from 11.1% to 13.0% over the years for elective episodes and vary 
between  10.2%  and  12.8%  for  emergency  episodes.    Hospitals  with  an  estimated  95% 
confidence interval which overlaps the axes do not diverge significantly from the average rate 
of AEs, and hospitals with a confidence interval above/below the axes have significantly 
higher/lower AE rates than the average, conditional on explanatory factors.  It is notable that 
for both elective and emergency patients, most hospitals lie above the overall predicted rate 
of AEs for all hospitals in Victoria.  Hospitals in the reference category perform only few 
operations  per  year,  and  these  are  probably  simple  procedures  associated  with  few 
complications.  This may explain why most of the larger hospitals for which we calculate 
fixed effects lie above the predicted rate.   
AE rates vary quite strongly across hospitals for elective inpatients, but less for emergency 
inpatients (in the following discussion, numbers for 2005/06 are presented in the text and 
numbers for 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 in brackets).  For only 7 (6, 4, 6) hospitals, estimates 
for elective AE rates are not significantly different from average rates; for all other hospitals, 
they are different.  Emergency rates, however, are insignificant for more than half of the 
sample (21 hospitals) in the last three years (03/04: 20; 04/05 and 05/06: 21), and 13 hospitals 
in  2002/03.    This  may  partly  be  explained  by  the  lower  number  of  observations  for 
emergency  episodes,  which  in  turn  leads  to  larger  confidence  intervals.    For  elective 
inpatients, 6 (4, 5, 3) hospitals lie below average AE rates, and 5 (6, 7, 9) hospitals lie below 
for emergency episodes.  For elective inpatients, 15 (9, 11, 11) hospitals have point estimates 
of  AE  rates  below  20%,  but  they  are  still  significantly  above  average.    For  emergency 10 
 
inpatients,  7  (4,  4,  14)  hospitals  lie  below  20%,  but  still  above  average.    For  elective 
inpatients, 7 (17, 15, 13) hospitals have point estimates above 20%, and 2 (3, 3, 0) even 
above 30%, and 2 (1, 4, 0) hospitals lie above 20% for emergency inpatients.   
Hospitals with above average AE rates in elective procedures tend also to have above average 
rates  in  emergency  procedures.    For  example,  hospitals  dum16  and  dum19  (teaching 
hospitals), and dum33 (a large regional hospital) are among the hospitals with highest AE 
rates for both groups of patients, in nearly each year.  Hospitals dum7, dum10, dum12 and 
dum34 (suburban/city hospitals), and dum24 and dum25 (large regional hospitals) are above 
average in most years, for both elective and surgery procedures.  Hospitals dum20 and dum23 
(large  regional  hospitals)  are  above  average  for  elective,  but  not  emergency  procedures.  
Hospital dum6 (a teaching and specialized hospital) is the only one with below average AE 
rates in all years for both elective and emergency procedures.  Hospitals dum18, dum26, 
dum35 and dum35 are below average in some years.   
Figure 9 shows AE rates for hospitals which lie significantly above or below predicted AE 
rates in all four years.  Hospitals which do not diverge significantly from average in at least 
one of the four years, or which lie below average in one, but above average in other years, are 
not charted in figure 9.  All rates are adjusted for explanatory factors, including patients‟ 
complexity, according to model (1).  A surprisingly large number, 21 out of 35 hospitals, 
differ from average AE rates in all years.  Of those, three regional (dum7, dum27, dum33), 
two teaching (dum3, dum16), and one suburban hospital (dum10) have AE rates at or above 
20% in all four years.  These rates are adjusted for patients‟ characteristics, and a comparison 
with unadjusted AE rates is revealing (see figure 10).  AE rates in figure 10 are not adjusted 
for patients‟ medical complexity or other explanatory factors.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
teaching hospitals report highest and above average AE rates, as they treat the most complex 
cases.  In fact, for most hospitals, unadjusted AE rates are higher than adjusted ones.  This 
implies  that  patient  characteristics,  in  particular  comorbidities,  explain  at  least  a  certain 
portion of the observed AEs.  The relatively marked differences in adjusted and unadjusted 
rates also imply that the explanatory variables in our model are relatively good predictors of 
AEs.   
Focusing on the hospitals with high adjusted AE rates, we find that the two teaching hospitals 
(dum3 and dum16) have even higher unadjusted AE rates.  This implies that high AE rates in 11 
 
those two hospitals are at least partly attributable to the fact that they treat patients of above 
average medical complexity.  This pattern can also be observed for other teaching hospitals 
(dum3, dum8, dum9, dum19).  The suburban hospital dum10 has similar AE rates whether 
they are adjusted for patient  complexity or not.  This  implies that  hospital  dum10 treats 
patients  of average medical  complexity and the high  AE rates in  this hospital cannot  be 
attributed to observed patient characteristics.  Interestingly, all three regional hospitals dum7, 
dum27 and dum33 with high adjusted AE rates have lower unadjusted AE rates.  This pattern 
can also be observed for a few other regional hospitals (dum23, dum24, dum25).  It implies 
that  (a)  those  hospitals  treat  patients  of  comparably  low  medical  complexity,  and  (b) 
unobservable factors not included in our model are most likely causing high AE rates in 
regional hospitals.   
 
Conclusion 
We use estimated average effects on hospital fixed effects in a binary variable model of AEs 
to make inference on the influence of hospitals on AEs, conditional on observable patient 
level risk factors.  Averaged over four years, we find that AE rates are 12% for elective 
surgical inpatients, and 12.5% for emergency surgical inpatients.  Across the years, quite a 
large number of hospitals show little changes in their AE rates for elective, but greater ones 
for emergency episodes.  The majority of teaching hospitals have surprisingly low AE rates, 
at least after adjusting for the higher medical complexity of their patients.  Large regional 
hospitals have high AE rates, in particular after adjusting for the below average complexity of 
their patients.  Also, some suburban hospitals have high AE rates, especially the ones located 
in areas of low socioeconomic profile.   
Of course, and as we discuss below, hospitals may differ from average AE rates for many 
reasons other than managerial competence (Hauck, Rice et al. 2003).  However, the working 
hypothesis  is  that  if  a  hospital  shows  comparably  large  and  statistically  significant 
divergences from average in all four years, there is strong prima facie evidence that some 
unobserved  factors  on  hospital  level  cause  these  large  divergences.    Once  patient 
characteristics have been controlled for, large variations indicate substantial disparities across 
hospitals in AE rates.  We infer that these disparities are, at least in part, due to managerial 
accomplishment.    For  example,  unobserved  managerial  actions  might  influence  the 12 
 
introduction and proper execution of safety checks and other measures on system level which 
prevent the occurrence of AE.  With this interpretation, we follow the economic literature on 
organizational  performance  assessment.    Estimated  average  effects  are  interpreted  as 
managerial  effort  on  hospital  level,  and  divergences  from  average  (predicted)  rates  of 
complications as below/above average performance.   
There have been proposals in the health economics literature to link incentive payments to 
observed performance on AEs (see McNair et al (2009), and Iezzoni (2009) for a critical 
discussion).  Our results indicate that care should be taken when interpreting fixed effects as 
indicators of performance, and even more so when linking payments to estimated AE rates.  
First,  adjustments  for  casemix  complexity  may  be  inadequate  because  of  unobservable 
differences in patients‟ medical complexity.  Hospitals in Victoria and other countries with 
casemix payment systems have sophisticated reporting systems and they are usually very 
diligent  in  reporting  patients‟  complexity  because  their  reimbursement  relies  on  accurate 
reporting.  They allocate each patient to one of hundreds of different disease resource groups 
(DRGs) which attract set amounts of payments from the government.  However, it has been 
shown that there are still differences in patients‟ complexity within DRGs which cannot be 
captured by the records (Olsen and Street 2008; Laudicella, Olsen et al. 2009).  If these 
differences vary systematically across hospitals, some hospitals could have higher AE rates 
simply because they tend to treat more complex patients within each DRG.  Holding them 
accountable for above average AE rates would be unreasonable as they are, at least partly, 
due to causes beyond their control.  This could be a possible reason for higher adjusted AE 
rates in teaching hospitals.  In our sample of Victorian hospitals, however, there is only one 
teaching hospitals with very high adjusted AE rates, whereas others have average or even 
lower than average AE rates.  This is an indication that our risk adjustment may be adequate, 
and that very high AE rates in one teaching hospital may indeed be due to poor performance.    
However, there is a second reason why care should be taken when interpreting fixed effects 
as indicators of performance.  Hospitals may vary in their diligence of reporting AEs.  In 
principle, hospitals have a strong financial incentive to report AEs, because it may allocate 
patients to a DRG category which attracts higher reimbursement.  However, this does not 
apply to all AEs.  In addition, our analysis is limited to „C-prefixed‟ complications and thus 
relies on hospitals attaching the prefix to complications which arise during admission.  Some 
hospitals  may  be  more  diligent  than  others  in  distinguishing  hospital  acquired  from 13 
 
community acquired complications.  For example, two hospitals (dum32 and dum36) do not 
report any AEs in all or some years, and a very low number in other years, which is likely 
due the fact that they systematically understate C-prefixed AEs in their patient records.  If all 
hospitals would misreport in a similar or random fashion, this would not be such a problem.  
It  is  quite  likely,  though,  that  misreporting  is  not  random,  which  makes  it  important  to 
interpret estimated AE rates with care, and investigate the reasons for very low or very high 
reported AE rates.  
Another reason why it is problematic to link payments to estimated performance is the fact 
that some causes for AEs on hospital level are most likely beyond the control of the hospital 
management.  We find that large regional hospitals in rural areas have high AE rates, in 
particular after taking account of their comparably low casemix complexity.  It is difficult to 
attract medical staff to work in rural areas, so poor performance may be due to underqualified 
and overworked doctors and nurses.  Also, there is anecdotal evidence that doctors are forced 
to undertake emergency procedures for patients which require immediate care and/or are too 
instable to be transported to a teaching hospital in Melbourne.  Those procedures may be 
associated with higher risk of AEs, but save lives in certain situations.  Cutting funding for 
hospitals operating under difficult conditions would be counterproductive and may result in 
even higher AE rates.  Instead, policy makers should look at ways of alleviating the pressure 
these hospitals are operating under to guarantee a high level of care for the rural population of 
Victoria.   
Some suburban hospitals have high AE rates, in particular the ones located in areas of low 
socioeconomic profile.  Patients in those hospitals are likely to be of lower socioeconomic 
profile and have greater medical needs, and attracting staff to work in those hospitals may be 
difficult.    Again,  cutting  funding for  these  hospitals  may  be counterproductive.   Instead, 
policy  makers  may  want  to  consider  encouraging  different  suburban  hospitals  to  each 
specialize on a limited range of procedures.  This may imply slightly higher travel costs for 
patients, because a particular procedure may not be offered by their local hospital but by one 
in  a  neighbouring  suburb.    However,  specialization  would  allow  hospitals  to  standardize 
procedures, to acquire specialized equipment and to target staff training more effectively.  
Greater standardization of procedures has been shown to help reduce AE rates in hospitals 
(Dankelman and Grimbergen 2005).    14 
 
Our analysis cannot inform on the reasons why some hospitals have above or below average 
AE rates.  However, we find surprising consistency in differences between unadjusted to 
adjusted AE rates across years, and for different types of hospitals.  Teaching hospitals tend 
to have lower adjusted than unadjusted AE rates, whereas regional hospitals have higher 
adjusted than unadjusted AE rates, consistently across all four years for most hospitals.  High 
AE rates in teaching hospitals seem partly explained by their above average patients‟ medical 
complexity,  whereas  large  regional  hospitals  seem  to  treat  patients  of  below  average 
complexity.  Comparing regional hospitals with all other hospitals in the sample, AE rates of 
regional hospitals should really be lower, considering that they treat relatively straightforward 
medical  cases.    This  is  an  indication  that  to  a  larger  extent  than  in  other  hospitals, 
unobservable factors on hospital level seem to be responsible for high AE rates in regional 
hospitals.  We can only speculate what these factors are, but staff shortages and insufficient 
capacity to undertake complex emergency procedures may be some of them.  These factors 
would be largely beyond the control of hospitals managers, but the responsibility of state and 
commonwealth government.  Therefore, we conclude that using AE rates as indicators of 
performance, or even linking performance payments to AE rates, may not be warranted at this 
point in time.  On the contrary, such measures could be counterproductive and aggravate the 
problem,  in  particular  in  regional  or  certain  suburban  hospitals  operating  under  difficult 
conditions.    Instead,  high  estimated  AE  rates  should  lead  to  further  investigation  of  the 
affected hospitals, and a constructive search for ways to help them reduce AEs on all levels 
of government.  Our results support policy makers in targeting system level approaches for 
the reduction of AEs to public hospitals in Victoria which most need their support.  
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Table 1: Variables definitions 
 
AE  α  has at least one adverse event   
     
Episode characteristics     
number of procedures  number of treatments and interventions   
severity grade 1  α is classified low medical complexity   
severity grade 2  α is classified medium medical complexity   
severity grade 3  α is classified high medical complexity   
multiple stays  α has more than one hospital stay in this financial year   
weekend admission  α is admitted on a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday   
home  α is discharged home   
death  α dies in hospital   
transfer  α is transferred to another hospital or hospital department   
     
Patient characteristics     
age  age of patient   
seifa  Index of social dis-/advantage, based on postcode of patient   
female  sex of patient   
obese  α is classified as obese   
private  α paid privately for the episode   
     
Charlson comorbidites     
ami  α has acute myocardial infarction   
chf  α has congestive heart failure   
pvd  α has peripheral vascular disease   
cva  α has a cerebrovascular event   
dementia  α has dementia   
copd  α has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease   
ctd  α has connective tissue disease   
pud  α has peptic ulcer   
ld  α has mild liver disease   
diab  α has diabetes   
hp papl  α has hemiplegia or paraplegia   
renaldis  α has renal disease   
cancer  α has cancer   
meta cancer  α has metastatic cancer   
severe ld  α has severe liver disease   
hiv  α is HIV positive or has AIDS   
     
Hospital characteristics     
teachosp  α is treated in a teaching hospital   
spec hosp  α is treated in a specialized hospital   
city hosp  α is treated in a city or suburban hospital   
regional hosp  α is treated in a large regional hospital   
smallregional hosp  α is treated in a small regional hospital   
other hosp  α is treated in any other hospital   
--------------------------------------------- 
α = Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if patient 16 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for elective inpatients 











                  Number of episodes  72,958  
 
 4,404  
 
 4,941  
 
 87,790  
 
                 
 
mean or %  SE  mean or %  SE  mean or %  SE  mean or %  SE 








                  Episode characteristics 
              numberop  3.2  1.3  3.3  1.2  3.3  1.2  3.4  1.2 

























































                  Patient characteristics 
                age  50.6  22.8  50.1  22.6  50.2  22.5  50.4  22.4 
seifa  984.8  73.2  982  72.0  982  71.1  983  71.2 






















                  Charlson comorbidites 

















































































































                  Hospital characteristics 












































Table 3: Summary statistics for emergency inpatients 











                  Number of episodes   44,380  
 
 41,475  
 
 42,600  
 
 43,771  
 
 
mean or %  SE  mean or %  SE  mean or %  SE  mean or %  SE 








                Episode characteristics 
              numberop  3.1  1.8  3.8  1.3  3.8  1.3  3.8  1.3 

























































                  Patient characteristics 
                age  51.1  25.3  50.0  24.9  49.7  24.7  50.1  24.8 
seifa  997.0  79.2  996  77.9  996  78.0  997  77.9 






















                  Charlson comorbidites 

















































































































                  Hospital characteristics 
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  predicted 







  ---------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  -------- 
variable  dy/dx  P>|z|  dy/dx  P>|z|  dy/dx  P>|z|  dy/dx  P>|z| 
---------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  -------- 
lnage  0.034  0.000  0.029  0.000  0.027  0.000  0.027  0.000 
seifa  0.000  0.128  0.000  0.023  0.000  0.923  0.000  0.231 
severi~1*  -0.012  0.000  -0.025  0.000  -0.033  0.000  -0.032  0.000 
severi~3*  0.089  0.000  0.099  0.000  0.102  0.000  0.109  0.000 
female*  0.002  0.341  0.000  0.960  -0.001  0.468  0.001  0.632 
private*  -0.005  0.148  -0.006  0.086  -0.008  0.024  -0.004  0.245 
multip~y*  0.042  0.000  0.044  0.000  0.038  0.000  0.035  0.000 
obese*  0.005  0.660  -0.009  0.354  -0.015  0.135  -0.035  0.000 
weeken~n*  -0.002  0.673  -0.002  0.686  -0.006  0.247  -0.022  0.000 
death*  0.011  0.277  -0.012  0.192  0.011  0.367  0.004  0.751 
transep*  0.024  0.000  0.017  0.000  0.021  0.000  0.020  0.000 
numberop  0.038  0.000  0.036  0.000  0.038  0.000  0.044  0.000 
ageop  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
agemulti  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
ami*  0.064  0.000  0.074  0.000  0.062  0.000  0.070  0.000 
chf*  0.049  0.000  0.052  0.000  0.055  0.000  0.059  0.000 
pvd*  0.020  0.022  0.043  0.000  0.031  0.001  0.033  0.001 
cva*  0.022  0.007  0.026  0.001  0.011  0.197  0.026  0.006 
dementia*  0.009  0.800  -0.019  0.475  -0.011  0.695  -0.016  0.641 
copd*  0.022  0.048  0.027  0.011  0.036  0.002  0.033  0.004 
ctd*  -0.041  0.098  -0.008  0.764  -0.063  0.013  -0.032  0.221 
pud*  -0.059  0.000  -0.002  0.944  0.073  0.087  0.060  0.069 
ld*  -0.041  0.019  -0.035  0.050  0.018  0.526  -0.043  0.012 
diab*  -0.031  0.000  -0.035  0.000  -0.038  0.000  -0.027  0.000 
parap*  -0.011  0.404  0.003  0.859  0.000  0.986  0.017  0.379 
renaldis*  0.047  0.000  0.045  0.000  0.041  0.000  0.039  0.000 
cancer*  0.011  0.001  0.011  0.000  0.007  0.030  0.017  0.000 
meta_c~r*  -0.059  0.000  -0.065  0.000  -0.068  0.000  -0.080  0.000 
severe~d*  0.010  0.816  0.114  0.073  -0.031  0.423  -0.058  0.027 
hiv*  0.065  0.147  -0.063  0.014  -0.051  0.088  -0.088  0.002 
 
* dy/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
^ marginal and average effects are evaluated at the mean of the other regressors 
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  ---------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  -------- 
variable  dy/dx  P>|z|  dy/dx  P>|z|  dy/dx  P>|z|  dy/dx  P>|z| 
---------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  --------  --------------  -------- 
lnage  0.050  0.000  0.058  0.000  0.036  0.000  0.042  0.000 
seifa  0.000  0.082  0.000  0.409  0.000  0.533  0.000  0.199 
severi~1*  -0.043  0.000  -0.082  0.000  -0.079  0.000  -0.070  0.000 
severi~3*  0.036  0.000  0.064  0.000  0.052  0.000  0.060  0.000 
female*  0.015  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.013  0.000  0.022  0.000 
private*  0.008  0.123  0.009  0.077  0.015  0.004  0.017  0.000 
multip~y*  0.046  0.000  0.059  0.000  0.057  0.000  0.037  0.000 
obese*  -0.028  0.075  -0.051  0.007  -0.036  0.075  -0.038  0.032 
weeken~n*  -0.005  0.038  -0.001  0.651  -0.007  0.030  -0.009  0.003 
death*   0.010  0.065  0.008  0.213  -0.013  0.051  -0.023  0.000 
transep*  -0.007  0.014  -0.018  0.000  -0.016  0.000  -0.032  0.000 
numberop  0.024  0.000  0.026  0.000  0.022  0.000  0.028  0.000 
ageop  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.012  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.167 
agemulti  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.004 
ami*  0.086  0.000  0.089  0.000  0.092  0.000  0.071  0.000 
chf*  0.020  0.002  0.020  0.014  0.007  0.412  0.015  0.069 
pvd*  0.078  0.000  0.062  0.000  0.110  0.000  0.096  0.000 
cva*  0.067  0.000  0.121  0.000  0.111  0.000  0.111  0.000 
dementia*  0.002  0.932  0.004  0.898  -0.037  0.187  -0.063  0.002 
copd*  0.034  0.000  0.069  0.000  0.037  0.004  0.079  0.000 
ctd*  0.036  0.346  -0.041  0.234  0.019  0.685  0.073  0.139 
pud*  0.069  0.000  0.152  0.000  0.122  0.000  0.173  0.000 
ld*  0.046  0.111  -0.002  0.943  0.038  0.259  -0.060  0.001 
diab*  -0.029  0.000  -0.042  0.000  -0.031  0.005  -0.013  0.267 
parap*  -0.034  0.000  -0.038  0.000  -0.042  0.000  -0.026  0.023 
renaldis*  0.035  0.000  0.036  0.000  0.050  0.000  0.041  0.000 
cancer*  0.013  0.032  0.013  0.086  0.018  0.023  0.029  0.000 
meta_c~r*  -0.059  0.000  -0.087  0.000  -0.091  0.000  -0.096  0.000 
severe~d*  -0.022  0.304  -0.008  0.802  -0.010  0.753  0.056  0.214 
hiv*  0.042  0.541  0.065  0.491  0.056  0.637  -0.037  0.549 
 
* dy/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
^ marginal and average effects are evaluated at the mean of the other regressors 
 




Figure 1: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, elective surgical inpatients, year 
2002/03





Figure 2: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, elective inpatients, year 2003/04
a 








Figure 3: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, elective inpatients, year 2004/05
a 





Figure 4: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, elective inpatients, year 2005/06
a 









Figure 5: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, emergency inpatients, year 2002/03
a 





Figure 6: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, emergency inpatients, year 2003/04
a 









Figure 7: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, emergency inpatients, year 2004/05
a 





Figure 8: Adverse event rates in Victorian hospitals, emergency inpatients, year 2005/06
a 





a sub: suburban; teach: teaching; reg: regional, spec: specialty 




Figure 9: AE rates for elective inpatients in hospitals significantly below or above the 
predicted rate in all four years






Figure 10: AE rates for elective inpatients in hospitals in all four years








a sub: suburban; teach: teaching; reg: regional, spec: specialty 
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